Indicators of Risks to Media Pluralism
Media Audience Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the concentration of audience and readership across media platforms based on audience share. Concentration is measured by using the nationwide biggest 4 owners in the market.
Why?
There is no available audience data for TV, radio and online, thus the risk of Media Audience Concentration in Kosovo is high. There is no agency providing public data on media audience measurements in Kosovo. The only measurements are done through public opinion surveys.
LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
---|---|---|
Audience concentration in Television (horizontal) | ||
Percentage: Missing Data | ||
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
Audience concentration in Radio (horizontal) | ||
Percentage: Missing data | ||
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
Readership concentration in newspapers (horizontal) | ||
Percentage: Not applicable | ||
If within one country the major 4 Owners have a readership share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a readership share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a readership share above 50%. |
Audience concentration in Internet (horizontal) | ||
Percentage: Missing data | ||
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
Media Market Concentration
Result: NO DATA
This indicator aims to assess the horizontal ownership concentration based on market share which illustrates the economic power of companies/ groups. Concentration is measured for each media sector by adding the market shares of the major owners in the sector.
Why?
Due to the unavailability of financial and audience data in the Kosovo media market, it is impossible to measure media ownership concentration. The media have not responded to MOM questions regarding their revenues, revenues from advertising and profit generated. According to existing legislation in Kosovo, the Tax Administration of Kosovo does not provide data on the financial circulation of businesses, including the media. In addition, the Ministry of Finances has not provided the financial statements of the media, either. The Independent Media Commission does not publish financial data of the media. Furthermore, due to the unavailability of other data, it is impossible to compute horizontal concentration. MOM was able to obtain financial data only for three TV stations, namely RTK, Klan Kosova and RTV 21. MOM was unable to calculate market shares of Radio and Online media companies due to unavailability of data. There is no print market in the country.
LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
---|---|---|
Media market concentration in television (horizontal): This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the TV media sector. | ||
Percentage: not assessed | ||
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
Media market concentration in radio (horizontal) : This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the Radio media sector. | ||
Percentage: not assessed | ||
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
Media market concentration in newspapers (horizontal): This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the print sector. | ||
Percentage: not applicable | ||
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
Media market concentration in Internet Content Providers | ||
Percentage: not assessed | ||
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
Regulatory Safeguards: Media Ownership Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator assesses the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration ownership and/or control in the different media.
Why?
The Republic of Kosovo does not have legislation that defines objective criteria to prevent media concentration. The Independent Media Commission, IMC, as the regulatory body as well as the Law regulating the IMC, do not contain criteria or limitations in order to identify or prevent media concentration.
The only mechanism for the regulation of competition is the Competition Authority, whose mission is to carry out activities aimed at creating conditions for the markets to provide more benefit for consumers, businesses and the society as a whole, protecting competition in the market, and promoting a healthy competition in Kosovo. However, the Competition Authority cannot specifically handle the issue of media ownership, due to a lack of regulation.
Currently, Kosovo is in the process of adopting new legislation on the Independent Media Commission which envisages the matter of media concentration, whereas the IMC has put the Draft Regulation on Media Concentration up for public consultations.
The situation is the same concerning radio and the internet.
Regulatory Safeguard Score:
3 out of 20 = High Risk (15%).
1 = media-specific regulation/ authority
0.5 = competition-related regulation/ authority
Nº | Television, Radio, print and Online | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.1 | Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector? | This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the TELEVISION sector. | x | |||
4.2 | Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the audiovisual sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)? | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration. | 1 | |||
4.3 | Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:
| 1 | |||
4.4 | Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media. | x | |||
Total | 2 out of 16 |
N° | MEDIA MERGERS | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.17 | Can a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector? | This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/ or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector through merging operations. For instance, the law should prevent concentration in merging operations: - By containing media-specific provisions that impose stricter thresholds than in other sectors; - The mandatory intervention of a media authority in merger and acquisition cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority); - The possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the communication authority for reasons of media pluralism (or public interest in general)); -that - even though they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not exclude the media sector from their scope of application. | x | |||
4.18 | Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with rules on mergers and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)? | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system. | 0.5 | |||
4.19 | Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioral and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:
| 0.5 | |||
4.20 | Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media. | x | |||
Total | 1 out of 4 |
SOURCES:
Cross-media Ownership Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership across the different sectors – TV, print, audio, and any other relevant media – of the media industry. Cross-media concentration is measured by adding up the market shares of the Top 8 media companies. The results are not an indicator for economic strength in different media sectors but rather for the potential influence on public opinion when considering all media types.
Why?
In Kosovo, there is no data to determine the major 8 media owners, as there is no market data. Furthermore, there is no available data on television viewership, radio listeners, nor the number of clicks of online media. The only available data is on related to likes on social media networks or interactions with users, but this data does not show the power and influence of a media. Therefore, the risk of Cross-Media Ownership Concentration is rated as HIGH RISK
N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
3 | Percentage: Missing Data | |||
If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share below 50% across the different media sectors. | If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have an audience share between 50% and 69% across the different media sectors. | If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share above 70% across the different media sectors. |
Regulatory Safeguards: Cross-media Ownership Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership between media types (press, TV, radio, internet). Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist among different countries with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of your country and in the light of the thresholds or limits imposed by domestic laws.
Why?
Regulatory Safeguard Score: 2 out of 8 – High Risk (Regulation: 20%)
The Republic of Kosovo does not have legislation that defines objective criteria to prevent cross-media concentration. The Independent Media Commission, IMC, as the regulatory body, as well as the Law regulating the IMC, do not contain criteria or limitations for identifying or preventing cross-media concentration.
The only authority responsible for regulating concentration is the Competition Authority, whose mission is to create conditions for the markets that benefit consumers, businesses and the society as a whole. It aims to protect market competition and promote healthy competition in Kosovo. However, the Competition Authority cannot specifically address the issue of cross-media ownership due to a lack of regulation.
Kosovo is currently adopting new legislation on the Independent Media Commission which envisages addressing the matter of media concentration, whereas the IMC has made the Draft Regulation on Media Concentration available for public consultations. This situation applies to radio, written media, and the internet as well.
N° | CROSS-MEDIA OWNERSHIP | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
5.1 | Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media? | This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors. | X | |||
5.2 | Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media authority) | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration. | 0.5 | |||
5.3 | Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:
| 0.5 | |||
5.4 | Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | The relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers. The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation. | X | |||
5.5 | Can a high degree of cross-ownership between different media be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector? | For instance, cross-ownership can be prevented by comptetion law: - by the mandatory intervention of a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority); - by the possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the competition authority for reasons of media pluralism (or Public interest in general); | X | |||
5.6 | Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority) | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors via merger control/competition rules. | 0.5 | |||
5.7 | Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | Examples sanctioning/enforcement powers and remedies: - blocking of a merger or acquisition; - obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - must carryobligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors ; - divestiture. | 0.5 | |||
5.8 | Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies of the regulation. | X | |||
Total | 2 out of 8 |
SOURCES:
Ownership Transparency
Result: Medium Risk
This indicator assesses the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners as ownership transparency is a crucial precondition to enforce media pluralism.
Why?
Media ownership structures and financial reports of all registered businesses are available at the Kosovo Business Registration Agency, KBRA. KBRA's web page enables the search of businesses by inputting the name of the business, business registration number or the ID of the owner. Furthermore, the online register biznesetehapura.com enabled by NGO "Open Data Kosovo'' is accessible to the public and allows searches by company or owner.
KBRA has granted access to MOM for all businesses operating in the media market, which enabled the team to see the history of ownership changes and documents submitted by the media as proof of ownership.
Furthermore, Independent Media Commission, IMC's web page contains the list of media (both radio and TV stations) licensed by the IMC. The IMC has also responded to FOI requests submitted by MOM and has shown the owners of businesses that applied for licenses or those that already own licenses issued by the IMC.
The Tax Administration of Kosovo and the Ministry of Finances have not responded to MOM on the financial statements of the media. Data is public only for several media: RTK, RTV 21, Klan Kosova and Kallxo.com.
In addition, MOM invited media owners to exercise transparency by responding to Information requests that were sent out in August 2023 to all media companies investigated. 15 out of 24 companies/media groups provided detailed replies to our information requests.
Active transparency means company/channel informs proactively and comprehensively about its ownership, data is constantly updated and easily verifiable.
In the revised sample of 104 entities (44 media outlets, 35 companies, and 25 owners), none were ranked as Actively Transparent.
Passive Transparency means that upon request, ownership data is easily available from the company/from a channel.
In the Passive Transparency category, 13 media outlets, including 4 TV stations, 4 radio stations, and 5 online media outlets, were found to be passively transparent. Additionally, 13 companies and 7 individual owners were also ranked as Passively Transparent, accounting for 31.73% of the entire sample.
Data publicly available means ownership data is easily available from other sources, e. g. public registries etc.
For the Data Publicly Available category, a more substantial number of entities were identified. This included 31 outlets, with 8 TV stations, 11 radio stations, and 12 online media outlets. Alongside these, 22 companies and 18 owners were categorized as having their Data Publicly Available. Overall, this represented 68.27% of the total sample of 104 entities, including media outlets, companies, and owners.
N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
---|---|---|---|
TRANSPARENCY | |||
6.1 | How would you assess the transparency and accessibility of data about media ownership? Active Transparency – 0% Passive Transparency – 31.73% Data Publicly Available – 68.27% Data Unavailable – 0% Active Disguise - 0% | ||
Data on media owners as well as their political affiliations is publicly available and transparent. (Active Transparency) Code if that applies to > 75% of the sample | Data of media owners and their political affiliations are disclosed based on investigations of journalists and media activists or upon request. (Passive Transparency, Publicly Available) Code if that applies > 50% of the sample. | Data on political affiliations of media owners are not easily accessible by the public and investigative journalists of activists are not successful in disclosing these data. (Data Unavailable, Active Disguise) Code if data is available for < 50% of the sample |
Regulatory Safeguards: Ownership Transparency
Result: Medium Risk
This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership and/or control.
Why?
According to the Law on the Independent Media Commission and the Regulations of the Independent Media Commission, Kosovo media are obliged to present to the IMC their data concerning ownership and changes in ownership when this change affects 10% or more shares. Furthermore, the media (televisions and radios) are obliged to submit their financial reports to the Independent Media Commission, while these reports are also submitted to the Tax Administration of Kosovo or the Department for Non Governmental Organisations, while there is no clear obligation for the media to publish their ownership information on their websites.
Likewise, the Independent Media Commission also has a media register, which reflects some other basic aspects of the media ownership structures.
Also, data related to the ownership of media that operate as businesses can also be found at the Business Registration Agency (ARBK).
Regulatory Safeguard Score:
3 out of 5 – Medium Risk (60%)
N° | Transparency Provisions | Description | Yes + | No - | NA | MD | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
7.1 | Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to the public? | The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for transparency towards the citizens, the users and the public in general. | 0.5 | ||||
7.2 | Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to report (changes in) ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)? | The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for accountability and transparency towards public authorities. | 1 | ||||
7.3 | Is there an obligation by national law to disclose relevant information after every change in ownership structure? | This question aims at assessing if the law provides rules on the public availability of accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership. This is a condition for an effective transparency. | 0.5 | ||||
7.4 | Are there any sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations? | This question aims at assessing if the law on media ownership transparency can be enforced through the application of sanctions. | 1 | ||||
7.5 | Do the obligations ensure that the public knows which legal or natural person effectively owns or controls the media company? | This question aim at assessing the effectiveness of the laws that deal with media ownership transparency and if they succeed in disclosing the real owners of the media outlets. | x | ||||
Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators)undefined | 3 out of 5 |
SOURCES:
Political Control Over Media Outlets
Result: High Risk
This indicator assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over editorial independence of newsrooms. It also assesses the level of interference by politically affiliated actors in the work of news media.
Why?
The number of media outlets in Kosovo is continuously increasing, despite having a market of only 1.7 million inhabitants. A portion of the media was established during the 90s, when Kosovo was under the Slobodan Milosevic regime. However, they had to start from scratch in 1999, after the end of the war, due to damaged infrastructure. The three national frequency television, RTK, KTV and RTV21 were established thanks to the donations of international organizations present in Kosovo, as well.
In the past 23 years since the aftermath of the war, there have been cases when media owners or journalists entered politics. Examples of cases when journalists, editors or media owners because politicians, advisors to ministers, prime ministers or presidents are numerous.
RTK – the Board of the Radio Television of Kosovo is elected by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. Members of Kosovo Parliament interview candidates for the Board of RTK, who are then voted by members of the Parliament to be entrusted with the role of members of the RTK Board. The latter is elected by the majority of members of the Parliament. Amongst their competencies are the selection of senior management of RTK, including the General Director of RTK and the directors of all channels. The RTK Board reports to the Parliamentary Committee on Budget and Finances on a three-months basis. Currently, RTK depends on the Government and the Assembly, due to their budget being allocated by the consolidated budget of the Republic of Kosovo.
Score: 2.37
N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
---|---|---|---|
POLITICISATION OF MEDIA OUTLETS | |||
8.1 | What is the share of TV media owned by politically affiliated entities? | ||
The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50% >30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | |
8.2 | What is the share of Radio stations owned by politically affiliated entities? | ||
The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | |
8.3 | What is the share of Newspapers owned by politically affiliated entities? MD | ||
The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | |
8.4 | What is the share of Online News Media owned by politically affiliated entities? MD | ||
The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | |
8.5 | To what degree is politically affiliated ownership transparent? | ||
There is only limited politically affiliated ownership in the country and in all cases, the owners and their interests are disclosed to the public. | The majority of politically controlled news media are transparent about their ownership and interests. | The majority of politically controlled media are secretive about their ownership and interests. | |
8.6 | Are there laws that regulate conflicts of interests between media ownership and political parties, partisan groups, party members, office holders and relatives? | ||
There is clear and effective regulation that highlights the incompatibility of political office (on the local, regional, national level) with media ownership and requires transparency in the case of other political offices. | There is regulation, but only covers some politically affiliated groups (effectively). | There is no regulation, or regulation is ineffective. | |
8.7 | Do politically partisan owners or other political interest systematically interfere with the editorial autonomy of newsrooms? | ||
The available evidence suggests very few or no attempts at interfering with editorial autonomy. | The available evidence suggests occasional interferences and/or some degree of self-censorship in newsrooms. | The available evidence suggests systemic interference with editorial autonomy, which may or may not be accompanied by self-censorship in newsrooms. | |
8.8 | To what extent is editorial independence guaranteed in editorial statutes or in self-regulatory mechanisms? | ||
Most news media in the country guarantee editorial independence in their statutes, or they subscribe to self-regulatory codes that do so. | The most prestigious news media in the country guarantee editorial independence in their statutes, or they subscribe to self-regulatory codes that do so. | Neither editorial statutes, nor self-regulation mentions editorial independence, or the guidelines are not respected by newsrooms. |
Political Control Over Infrastructure
Result: Low Risk
This indicator assesses the political control over important infrastructural layers in the distribution, as well as in the value and supply chains of media content. It also assesses the level of discrimination in favour of politically affiliated media distribution networks. Infrastructural elements are in most cases privately owned and access is provided to news publishers for a fee.
Why?
9.1 Print Distribution Networks – Not applicable for the Kosovo market since there is no print media..
9.2 Radio Distribution Networks –The IMC licenses radio stations in Kosovo. Radio stations have either local, regional or national level frequency. There is no political control on the radio stations, due to the medium not being amongst the most influential media.
9.3 Television Distribution Networks – There are only three national level frequency media, namely RTK, KTV and RTV 21. They were granted their national frequencies in 2000. Since then, no new national frequency licenses have been issued nor revoked. There have been attempts to re-tender these three licenses, however they never received the necessary support of the relevant institutions to do so.
9.4 Leading Internet distribution networks in Kosovo are IPKO, Kosovo Telekom (KT), Art Motion, Kujtesa, Telkos and MTS (subsidiary of Srbija Telekom).
9.5 The advertising market in Kosovo is dispersed. Majority of advertising is directly contracted through the advertising businesses/companies, thus avoiding marketing/advertising agencies. There are no indications that advertising companies discriminate against independent media, therefore the assessment is low risk.
9.6. There is no agency or mechanism that measures audience share in the country. Thus, the assessment is high risk.
Score: 7/5 = 1.4 Low Risk
Nº | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
---|---|---|---|
POLITICISATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE | |||
9.1 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading distribution networks for print media? N/A | ||
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. | |
9.2 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading radio distribution networks? | ||
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. | |
9.3 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading television distribution networks? | ||
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. | |
9.4 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading internet distribution networks? | ||
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. | |
9.5 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading service providers in the advertising market? | ||
There is no indication that major commercial advertising agencies / sales houses would discriminate against independent media. | At least one of the leading commercial advertising agencies / sales houses discriminates against independent media due to political affiliations (despite having a significant audience share). | Independent news media don’t have access to commercial advertising agencies / sales houses discriminating against independent media due to political affiliations (despite having a significant audience share). | |
9.6 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading audience measurement services? | ||
Audience measurement services are in practice available to all relevant market players and comply with industry standards; transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity and inclusiveness of the methodology and the service is guaranteed. | At least one of the leading audience measurement services raises concerns related to transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity, and/or inclusiveness. | All of the leading audience measurement services raise concerns related to transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity, and/or inclusiveness. |
State Control Over Media Resources
Result: Low Risk
This indicator assesses the influence of the state on the functioning of the media market, through control over public funds and resources, with an emphasis on the risk of discrimination in the distribution of state support and advertisement. The discrimination can be reflected in favouritism towards political parties or affiliates of political parties in the government, or in penalising the media criticising the government.
Why?
In 2023, no funds were allocated by the Government for private media in Kosovo. The current Government had pledged to prohibit allocation of funds for advertisement in the media, and once in power it stopped all advertisement contracts between the Government and the media on one hand, and public enterprises and the media, on the other.
Kosovo has a Public Broadcasting Service, PBS, and the only public funds invested in a media go to the latter, namely RTK. The funds allocated for the public TV are channelled through the Assembly of Kosovo. This form of funding has been criticised widely as a form of political influence on the RTK. Usually, the Assembly of Kosovo allocated the budget requested by the RTK, however, the amounts allocated are usually smaller than those requested by the RTK.
In July 2023, the Government allocated a small fund of 50,000 for non-majority communities. The funds were distributed through an open call open to all interested parties, while the process of application was transparent.
The Government notified that the funds were distributed to the following media “SH.I.M. Kosovahaber” from Turkish community with 6,500 euros; “Connection Media” from Roma community with 5,500 euros; “Gazeta Scanner” from Egyptian community with 7,800 euros; media “Prosperiteti” from Ashkali community with 7,500 euros, “Dardana Press” from Roma community 4,500 euros, “Radio Televizija Mir” from the Serb community with 6,500 euros and “RTV Plus”, from the Serb community with 6,000 euros.
Score:1.14 = Low Risk
N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
---|---|---|---|
10.1 | Is state advertising distributed to media proportionately to their audience share? Not applicable | ||
State advertising is distributed to the media relatively proportionately to the audience shares of media. | State advertising is distributed disproportionately (in terms of audience share) to the media. | State advertising is distributed exclusively to few media outlets, which do not cover all major media outlets in the country. | |
10.2 | How would you assess the rules of distribution of state advertising? Not applicable | ||
State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on fair and transparent rules. | State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on a set of rules but it is unclear whether they are fair and transparent. | There are no rules regarding distribution of state advertising to media outlets or these are not transparent and/or fair. | |
IMPORTANCE OF STATE ADVERTISING | |||
10.3 | What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Television advertising market? VALUE: 0% | ||
Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market | |
10.4 | What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Radio advertising market? VALUE: 0% | ||
Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market. | |
10.5 | What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Newspaper advertising market? VALUE: N/A | ||
Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market. | |
10.6 | What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Online news media advertising market (without amounts spent on news intermediaries)? VALUE: 0% | ||
Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market. | |
10.7 | Is direct financial support distributed fairly, transparently and based on clear rules? | ||
There are clear rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies and, in practice, subsidies are transparently and fairly allocated (criteria may not only be based on market share, but also public interest content, underserved communities, the need for innovation, etc.) | The rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies are either not clear or the process of allocation lacks sufficient transparency or shows signs of political bias. | There are no rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies and/or the allocation of subsidies is opaque and/or clearly discriminatory. | |
10.8 | Is indirect financial support distributed fairly, transparently and based on clear rules? N/A | ||
There are clear rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies and, in practice, access to indirect subsidies is transparent and fair. | The rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies are either not clear or the process of allocation lacks sufficient transparency or shows signs of political bias. | There are no rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies and/or the allocation of indirect subsidies is opaque and/or clearly discriminatory. | |
10.9 | Do all media outlets have access to the state-financed news agency, and do they receive quality content relevant for their news production? | ||
There is a state-financed news agency in the country that is accessible to all news media under the same (and fair) conditions, providing objective, well-sourced information. | There are some concerns related to access to the state financed news agency or possible bias in the content provided. | Access to the state-owned news agency causes unnecessary burden for some news media and/or its content is biased. | |
10.10 | Do you consider the financing of the PSM independent and adequate? | ||
The financing of the PSM is adequate, without distorting competition with private media; and the process includes sufficient guarantees against political dependencies (e.g. through licence fees)? | The financing of the PSM is insufficient or could distort competition with private media; and the funding process may enable political dependencies? | The financing is insufficient to a degree that quality journalism is not or hardly possible and/or the funding process is clearly under political control. | |
10.11 | How do you assess the independence of the appointment and dismissal process of the PSM management? | ||
There are clear rules on the appointment and dismissal of the PSM management, independence from political actors is guaranteed; and in practice appointments and dismissal decisions are made based on professional considerations. | Appointment and dismissal rules of PSM management may allow for some political influence and/or the practice of appointments and dismissals shows signs of bias. | Rules on appointment and dismissal of PSM management clearly enable political influence and/or appointments and/or dismissals are clearly politically motivated. |
Regulatory Safeguards: Net Neutrality
Risk: Medium Risk
Network neutrality is the principle that all data on networks should be treated equally by not discriminating or charging differently in terms of users, content, sites or applications. Protecting net neutrality is essential to safeguarding media diversity because it guarantees equal ability to access and disseminate information, opinions, perspectives, etc. online, which is essential to media diversity. This indicator aims to capture the landscape of legal regulation of net neutrality as well as the specific regulatory mechanisms that address net neutrality.
Why?
The obligations of companies that provide access to the Internet Service (ISP) concerning the net neutrality rules are specified in the Regulations approved by the Regulatory Authority for Electronic and Postal Communications (RAEPC): Regulation No. 37 for General Authorizations and Regulation No. 38 on Contracts, Transparency and Publication of Information and other Protective Measures for End Users for the Provision of Electronic Communications Networks and Services.
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) when providing services must treat all types of traffic equally, on a non-discriminatory basis, without restrictions or interference, and regardless of the sender and recipient, the content accessed or distributed, the applications or services offered or distributed, or the terminal equipment used.
The current legislation does not regulate "zero rating". In 2017, during public consultations with various stakeholders, RAEPC proposed the adjustment of the "zero rating", however, after obtaining comments from operators and taking into account the fact that the "zero rating" was not applied by the operators, they decided not to regulate this issue.
Based on the current Regulatory framework for Electronic Communications, the issue of content regulation, including web pages, is outside the domain of RAEPC’s responsibilities.
However, in specific cases, in implementation of the decisions issued by various Institutions such as, e.g. the decision of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation, where one of the requests was the closure of certain websites of Russian televisions, in this case, in accordance with the opinion of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), RAEPC instructed Internet access service providers to undertake all necessary actions to implement the decisions.https://www.arkep-rks.org/NewsDetails/7/261
Score: 6 out of 11 = (55%) Medium Risk
NET NEUTRALITY | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Does national law address net neutrality directly or indirectly? | neutrality is regulated by domestic law in any way; it also aims to reflect any agreement between countries, as in the EU and countries that are part of the Council of Europe. | 1 | |||
Does national law contain norms that prohibit blocking of websites or content online? | This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent blocking, one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework | 0.5 | |||
Does national law contain norms that prohibit throttling of services or content provided online? | This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent throttling, one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework | 0.5 | |||
Does national law contain norms that prohibit zero-rating and/or paid prioritization? | This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent zero-rating (of which paid prioritization is a common form), one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework | x | |||
Where net neutrality is protected by law, does the legal framework recognize any exceptions, e.g. for reasonable network management? | This question establishes when reasonable limits are placed on net neutrality protections versus other limits that may undermine its effectiveness. | 1 | |||
Norms that prohibit or limit zero-rating are successfully implemented: Paid prioritization does not take place. | This question aims to flesh out the extent to which paid prioritization occurs in practice despite its prohibition in law; a number of countries with ostensibly strong zero-rating protections experience this phenomenon. This indicator may shed light on the degree of difference between law and practices on the ground | x | |||
Norms that prohibit or limit zero-rating are successfully implemented: No other forms of zero-rating take place. | Same as above | x | |||
Norms are successfully implemented: Blocking and/or throttling do not take place. | This question seeks to determine how the legal framework in place to protect net neutrality operates in practice with respect to blocking and throttling | x | |||
Are there regulatory or other entities charged with monitoring and enforcing net neutrality protections? | This question highlights whether there are authorities charged with enforcing net neutrality protections | 1 | |||
Have sanctions been imposed for violations of net neutrality protections where these exist? | This question may illustrate the extent to which violations of net neutrality norms are taken seriously as a matter of rule of law and political will | 1 | |||
Are the enforcement mechanisms in place to identify and respond to net neutrality violations viewed as effective? | This question shows the extent to which net neutrality norms actually achieve their goals | 1 | |||
Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators) | 6 out of 11 |
Gender Imbalance in the Media Industry
Result: High Risk
This indicator assesses the representation of women in news media, focusing on relevant newsroom policies and the share of women in management positions.
Why?
According to a survey conducted by Peaceful Change Initiative in Kosovo, there are twice as many women journalists than editors, while the position of editors-in-chief represents a very low percentage of women. Still it is hard to conclude if women still face enormous odds like the glass ceiling in media jobs, without having statistical data on leading editorial positions in the newsroom and see if there is any disparity in leading positions.
A report from Kosovo Journalists Association (AJK) confirms that there is no statistical data on leading editorial positions in the newsrooms, but that women journalists are more likely to hold editorial positions in the newsroom, especially in the mainstream media, whereas the men journalists are more in charge of the managerial sector. None of the 265 women respondents held a managerial position.
Poor representation of women in debates on TV news channels has been an important issue that has been frequently raised and highlighted by the community of journalists in Kosovo. But the absence of women from the screen is in total contrast with the visual presence during TV news, with women representing the majority of field reporters.
BIRN engaged in monitoring four major TV broadcasters in Kosovo over a two-week period, January 15-31 2023. During the monitoring, BIRN counted a total of 100 male guests on political talk shows, and just nine women. Men, usually involved in politics or civil society, dominated discussions about politics, security and the economy. The tone was often combative amongst the panellists.
The nine women were invited to talk about domestic violence and foreign policy.
BIRN monitoring also showed that on social networks, negative comments aimed at female guests were often unrelated to the topic of discussion, whereas comments concerning the male guests were invariably relevant to the issue at hand.
At the same time, the 2022 Journalists Safety Index of the Association of Kosovo Journalists has shown that in comparison to 2021, when there were three cases of attacks, threats and harassment toward women journalists reported to the AJK, during 2022, their number doubled. In 2022, besides the 6 cases of attacks, threats and harassment towards women journalists, there are 15 cases of attacks, one group out of which include women journalists. The same report noted that overall, the working conditions of women journalists in the newsroom are not different from those of their male counterparts. It also emphasised that although there is no official data on how many women and men have signed employment contracts, according to some assessments, there are noticeably more women journalists in the newsrooms. Furthermore, according to AJK’s database, which consists of 900 journalists, editors, cameramen and photojournalists, there are over 550 journalists and editors, over 300 of whom are women.
Out of the media in the MOM sample in Kosovo, 8 are either owned by women, or women hold shares in them, while 33 are owned by men.
Score: 2.62 = High Risk
N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
---|---|---|---|
12.1 | Do the leading news media in your country have a policy aiming at a balanced representation of women in the newsroom? | ||
Most leading news media have a gender equality policy or other kinds of self-regulatory measures to make sure that there is adequate representation of women in the newsrooms and in management positions. Moreover, there are mechanisms at place to make sure women in the newsroom don’t encounter harassment or discrimination. | Some news media have a gender equality policy or other kinds of self-regulatory measures to make sure that there is adequate representation of women in the newsrooms and in management positions. In these news media, there are mechanisms at place to make sure women in the newsroom don’t encounter harassment or discrimination. | There is no gender equality policy in the newsrooms assessed, or they are not effective, leading to discrimination and harassment of female journalists. | |
12.2 | Are women journalists subject to harassment or online/ offline violence in your country? | ||
The working environment of women journalists is safe, harassment online or offline is not common, sufficient safeguards are in place. | Both men and women are harassed to a similar extent, (physical) violence against female journalists is not common. | Cases of violence are reported and harassment of women journalists is common in the country, with many known and reported cases. Women are considered to be more targeted by harassment and violence than men. | |
12.3 | What is the share of women among owners of leading news media? VALUE Radio: 20% VALUE Online: 36% VALUE TV: 30% Average of VALUES: 28.67% | ||
40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
12.4 | What is the share of women among founders of news media? VALUE TV: 5.2% VALUE Radio: 13.6% VALUE Online: 13.7% Average of VALUES: 10.8% | ||
40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
12.5 | What is the share of women amongst top managers of news media (such as the CEO)? VALUE TV: 20% VALUE Radio: 39.2% VALUE Online: 31.2% Average of VALUES: 30.1% | ||
40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
12.6 | What is the share of women in key editorial positions in the newsroom (such as leading editors below the level of editor-in-chief or department heads at television stations)? VALUE TV: 25% VALUE Radio: 26% VALUE Online: 35% Average of VALUES: 28.66% | ||
40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
12.7 | What is the share of women in key (board) positions in the newsroom (meaning non-editorial management positions, such as chief financial officer, head of sales and marketing, etc.)? Missing Data | ||
40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent |